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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue properly before this Court is whether the trial court correctly ruled,
as a matter of law, that Appellants were not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16. This issue was preserved by motions and memoranda
submitted to the trial court. (R. 771-781, 814-815.) Standard of Review. "The proper
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which we review for
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusion."
State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304,118,169 P.3d 778, 781.
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Determinative of the issue before the court is the statutory provisions in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-16:
Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, at any time prior
to final payment of compensation and damages awarded the
defendant by the court or jury, abandon the proceedings and cause
the action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that
as a condition of dismissal condemner first compensate condemnee
for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse him in full for
all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by
condemnee because of the filing of the action by the condemner,
including attorneys fees.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The core of this matter is Provo City's determination that condemnation of

properties owned by the Appellants (collectively the "Ivies") was required to construct a
public roadway which would provide an arterial connection between existing roads in the
City and Utah County. Though the procedural history of the condemnation is somewhat
convoluted, the City has ultimately obtained possession of the properties at issue and
constructed the roadway. The process has involved two separate condemnation
proceedings, the first of which forms the basis of Ivies' claim for costs and attorney fees.
The sole issue properly before this Court is whether the trial court correctly construed
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 under the facts of this case to deny Ivies their claim for
attorney fees and costs.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City initially commenced condemnation proceedings on June 12, 2002.

(R. 35.) The trial court subsequently issued an order of immediate occupancy.
(R. 333-336.) Ivies sought and obtained interlocutory review of that order, challenging
the City's authority to use its powers of eminent domain to condemn property
extraterritorially . The Supreme Court ruled in Provo City v. Ivie. 2004 UT 30, 94 P.3d
206 ("Me I") that the City lacked constitutional or express or implied power to directly
condemn the properties outside its municipal boundaries.
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Taking the Supreme Court's ruling in Ivie I at face value, Le.9 that it could
condemn the property with the cooperation of Utah County, the City entered into an
interlocal agreement with the County to do so. On May 27, 2004, the County filed a
condemnation complaint in the Fourth District Court as Civil No. 040401797. Denying
the Ivies5 motion to dismiss, the Fourth District Court found authority for the
condemnation and granted an order of immediate occupancy. Again, Ivies sought and
obtained interlocutory appeal of the order. In Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33,137 P.3d
797 ("Ivie IF9), the Supreme Court held that the County has authority to contract by
interlocal agreement with the City for condemnation of the properties and remanded to
the trial court. That action continues. The Court's order of immediate occupancy has
permitted the City to proceed with construction of the roadway. The only issue remaining
in that action is the amount of just compensation to be awarded consisting of a
combination of the value of the property taken and severance damages. Trial on those
issues is set for January 28, 2008.
On July 20, 2006, the City prepared a motion to the district court to consolidate the
two condemnation proceedings and apply the deposited funds toward the amount required
in the Utah County action which was filed on July 25. (R. 582.) Crossing in the mail was
Ivies' motion to dismiss. (R. 497.) The trial court dismissed the action for mootness and
failure to prosecute, but expressly reserved for future consideration the issues of
abandonment and whether statutory costs and fees were justified. (R. 742-43.)

3

Ivies subsequently sought an award of fees and costs. (R. 781.)1 After briefing of
the issue, the trial court denied the motion for fees and costs, ruling that the statutory
requirements had not been met. (R. 837-842.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue presented by this appeal is not one of first impression. The Supreme
Court has already construed Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 to require that actual, total
abandonment of a condemnation proceeding is required in order to justify a statutory
award of attorney fees and costs. Moreover, the statute requires, in addition to
abandonment, that the condemning authority cause the condemnation action to be
dismissed and that the dismissal be with prejudice. None of these requirements have been
satisfied in this matter. Because the requirements are conjunctive, failure to satisfy any
one of them is sufficient to preclude the award sought by Ivies.
The City has never "abandoned" its effort to acquire by condemnation the Ivies'
property for purposes of constructing the arterial connecting roadway. In fact, it has
acquired those properties and completed construction of the road in question. In this
context, it defies logic to suggest that the condemnation has been abandoned by the City.
In addition, the City did not cause the condemnation to be dismissed. It did, as a
result of appeals by Ivies, delay its decision as to whether to amend its action to pursue

:

The trial record does not appear to contain a motion for fees and costs. The
record reference is to Ivies5 memorandum in support of their motion.
4

the condemnation under alternative authority, including subsequent legislative
authorization for extraterritorial condemnation, pending resolution of the legal challenge
to its attempt to acquire the properties in cooperation with Utah County. That delay,
however, was caused by Ivies, not by the City.
Nor did the trial court dismiss the condemnation action without prejudice as
required by § 78-34-16. Dismissal was, as a matter of law, with prejudice.
Under the plain and unambiguous language of § 78-34-16, as previously construed
by the Supreme Court, the requirements for an award of attorney fees and costs have not
been satisfied. The trial court therefore correctly denied Ivies' motion for that award.
For the first time on appeal, Ivies also argue that Article I, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution entitles them to an award of fees in this matter. That issue was never
presented to nor ruled on by the trial court. As a matter of well-established law, Ivies
waived the constitutional issue and it is not properly before this Court.
Even if the issue had been timely and appropriately preserved, however, Ivies'
arguments that they are entitled to attorney fees as part of just compensation simply are
not supportable. Even assuming that Ivies' legal arguments applied under the Utah
Constitution, just compensation involves only compensation for a taking, not
compensation for avoiding a taking. Compensation only becomes due on successful
condemnation of property. In Ivie L Ivies successfully avoided the condemnation of their
properties. There was no compensable taking which resulted from the original

5

condemnation proceeding. As a result, regardless of whether fees and costs are
awardable as compensation for a taking, they are not appropriate here because no taking
occurred.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has already determined that fees may be
recovered only where provided by statute and are not included within the just
compensation constitutionally imposed for the taking of property. As a result, Ivies are
entitled to recover their fees and costs only if they can establish that the statutory
requirements for that award have been satisfied. The three requirements have not been
met; therefore, there is no entitlement to the award.
The trial court correctly evaluated the issue which was presented to it and had no
opportunity to address the constitutional issue belatedly raised by Ivies on appeal. As a
result, it is appropriate for this Court to affirm the decision of the trial court to deny Ivies'
motion for costs and attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IVIES ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER § 78-34-16 AND THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE.
A.

PROPER APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION PRECLUDES IVIES' CLAIM FOR A
STATUTORY AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.

It is axiomatic that a prevailing party in litigation is entitled to an award of attorney
fees only where provided by contract or statute. The statutory provision providing the

6

basis for Ivies' motion to the trial court permits an award of fees only under narrowly
specified circumstances.
Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, at any time prior
to final payment of compensation and damages awarded the
defendant by the court or jury, abandon the proceedings and cause
the action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that
as a condition of dismissal condemner first compensate condemnee
for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse him in full for
all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by
condemnee because of the filing of the action by the condemner,
including attorneys fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16.2
In interpreting a statute such as this, courts rely on the plain language of the statute
itself. E.g., Bradley v. Payson City Corp.. 2003 UT 16, If 35, 70 P.3d 47, 57. Courts are
instructed to "assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory
words are read literally unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable."
K & T. Inc. v. Korouis. 888 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 1994) (punctuation, citation omitted).
A "cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantial terms
into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the
language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an
intention not expressed.'5 Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)
(citations omitted). This Court consistently follows these rules of statutory construction.

2

While the statute uses "condemner," the bulk of the case law and literature use the
word "condemnor." The latter is used in this brief.
7

E.g., Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Common, 908 P.2d 871, 875
(Utah App. 1995); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHerrera, 2006 UT App 388,
1113,145 P.3d 1172,1176.
The terms in § 78-34-16 are unambiguous. The City must have abandoned the
condemnation, it must have caused the litigation to be dismissed, and the condemnation
action must have been dismissed without prejudice. None of those elements are present
in this matter.
There is no question that the City has never abandoned its efforts to acquire Ivies'
properties by condemnation. Even after the Supreme Court determined that it could not
do so directly, it proceeded, with the Supreme Court's subsequent approval in Ivie II, to
acquire the properties by interlocal agreement with Utah County. It has paid for the
condemnation proceeding conducted by the County, paid the statutory deposit to take
possession of the premises under an order of immediate occupancy, and has actually
constructed the road. The only remaining issues in that litigation relate to valuation of the
properties and severance damages. Trial on those issues is set for January 28, 2008.
Under these facts and circumstances, it is illogical to speak of the City as having
abandoned the condemnation proceedings.
Abandonment, however, is only one of the three elements required for a fee and
cost award. The statute also requires that the condemning authority have "caused the
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action to be dismissed." Here, the City did not cause the dismissal and, in fact, sought to
have the proceeding consolidated with the Utah County condemnation.
Further, dismissal was required to be without prejudice. In this case, the dismissal
was with prejudice, failing to satisfy the statutory requirement.
B.

THE CITY NEVER ABANDONED ITS EFFORTS TO CONDEMN
THE PROPERTIES FOR USE AS A PUBLIC ROADWAY.

The key to analysis of the abandonment issue is whether the City voluntarily
abandoned its condemnation of Ivies' properties. Abandonment is defined as the
voluntary relinquishment of a right "with the intention of not reclaiming it." Black's Law
Dictionary (5 ed. 1979). "Abandonment includes both the intention to abandon and the
external act by which the intention is carried into effect." Id Though not directly
addressed by Utah appellate courts, there is abundant case law holding that voluntariness
is a requirement for abandonment under most condemnation attorney fee statutes.
E.g., Essex County Improvement Auth. v. BAR Dev. Assoc. 733 A.2d 580, 586
(NJ. Super. 1999) ("[T]he external act must be voluntary. The condemning authority
must voluntarily surrender its right of eminent domain.") Even the case cited by Ivies,
Knox County v. Union Livestock Yard, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 158 (Tenn. App. 2001)
recognizes that the abandonment must be voluntary. "This Court has held that to
constitute an abandonment under this section, there must be a voluntary act by the
condemning authority." Knox County at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis
added).
9

The attorney fee provision in § 78-34-16 was addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991). The Koller court held that
(1) both abandonment and dismissal were required for an award of fees and costs; and
(2) amendment of a complaint to seek a perpetual easement rather than a fee simple title
was not an abandonment of the condemnation which would give rise to fees. Koller
at 315. Where the Town continued its efforts to acquire the property, no fees were
appropriate. The Koller court noted that abandonment called for in the statute was total
abandonment of the condemnation.
Cornish proceeded with its acquisition and did not move for
dismissal of the condemnation proceedings. We interpret the statute
as providing for payment of costs and fees only when the
condemnation is totally abandoned and dismissed prior to its
conclusion.
Koller at 315 (underlined emphasis added, italicized emphasis in original). The court
recognized the broad scope of expenses recoverable under the statute but emphasized that
"an actual abandonment and dismissal must first occur." Id. (emphasis added).
In a case somewhat similar to the Koller case, a condemnor decided after
commencing the proceedings that more land was necessary than originally sought in the
complaint. Los Angeles County v. Hale, 331 P.2d 166 (Cal. App. 1958). The condemnor
sought dismissal of the action and subsequently commenced a new condemnation
including the original parcel as part of the land being condemned. The Hale court
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concluded that where the second action was prosecuted through to an award of the fee
estate, the condemnation had not been abandoned. Hale at 168.
More factually similar to the matter before this Court is Martineau v. State
Conservation Common, 194 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1972). There, the defendant appealed a
trial court ruling that the condemnor had authority to condemn. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruled that the entity lacked condemnation authority. Addressing the fee issue in
that context, the Martineau court phrased the question as whether the statute
"contemplates awarding attorney's fees in the event of an involuntary abandonment of
condemnation proceedings brought about by a mandate of this court.55 Martineau at 667.
Reviewing the case law, the Martineau court concluded that "[c]learly, those courts which
have considered the question of taxing attorney's fees and other costs against the
condemnor after involuntary dismissal of the proceedings under statutes similar to
ours . . . uniformly hold that the statute was not intended to apply to such a situation.55
Id. at 668.3 The Martineau court concluded that construction of the statutory language
precluded an award to the defendant because the entity had not voluntarily abandoned the
condemnation.
In another California case, City of Los Angeles v. Abbott. 17 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1933),
the defendants had obtained an injunction against the city to end the condemnation

3

The court also noted that the cases cited by the defendant for a different
conclusion, as with the cases cited by Ivies before the trial court, "arose in states in which
the relevant statute is substantially different.. .55 Martineau at 669.
11

proceeding based upon invalidity of the condemnation ordinances. The City appealed the
injunction and the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's issuance of the
injunction. After the appellate decision, the defendant moved for dismissal of the
condemnation and sought a fee award. The Abbott court observed that "it is not every
abandonment by the condemnor which entitles the defendant to his costs and attorneys'
fees." Abbott at 995. It then formulated the issue as "whether, when a condemnation suit
is permanently enjoined, the defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees." Id. at 996.
Applying the California statute, the Abbott court concluded that abandonment cannot be
voluntary under those facts.
We are of the opinion that the language used, liberally construed,
means that in every case involving a voluntary abandonment
attorneys' fees may be recovered, but we do not think that the statute
can possibly be interpreted to apply to a case where the
condemnation action is terminated without the consent, express or
implied, and against the wish and will of the condemnor. We are of
the opinion, therefore, that the section only refers to cases of
voluntary abandonment and not to cases of involuntary
abandonment.
. . . [Wjhere the condemnor, as here, has conclusively shown that it
in good faith was prosecuting the action, and only desisted because
of an injunction, no good reason exists why the defendants should
recover their attorneys' fees.
Abbott at 997.
Ivies cite a Colorado Court of Appeals decision, Platte River Power Auth. v.
Nelson, 775 P.2d 82 (Colo. App. 1989) to support their abandonment argument. While
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the factual circumstances in Platte River are similar to those here, the language of the
Colorado statute is quite different:
If the court finds that a petitioner is not authorized by law to acquire
real property or interests therein sought in a condemnation
proceeding, it shall award reasonable attorney fees, in addition to any
other costs assessed, to the property owner who participated in the
proceedings.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-1-122(1). The conditions on which a cost and fee award is based in
Colorado are qualitatively different from those in § 78-34-16. As a matter of statutory
construction, it is improper for a court to read into the Utah statute provisions from other
jurisdictions which contain substantive language not present in the Utah statute.
Section 78-34-16 has no provision for compensation where a condemning authority
proceeds without authorization by law. It only provides for an award of fees in the case
of abandonment and then only where the action is dismissed without prejudice. The
Court should decline the invitation to engage in judicial legislation to make the Colorado
provision a part of § 78-34-16.
The Utah case relied upon by Ivies for their abandonment claim is
Provo City Corp. v. Cropper. 497 P.2d 629 (Utah 1972). The facts in Cropper, however,
are substantially different from those presented here. In Cropper, the City determined that
the cost to acquire the property by condemnation was too high and expressly stated in
open court that it had concluded that it should withdraw from and dismiss the action.
Cropper at 629. Based on the City's representations that it no longer needed the property

13

for public use and intended not to pursue the condemnation, the court struck the case from
its trial calendar. Id.
These are crucial facts which distinguish Ivies5 situation from that in Cropper.
The City in Cropper voluntarily caused the dismissal of the action and expressly
represented to the court that it was abandoning its efforts to condemn the property.
Under those facts, the Cropper defendants sought their attorney fees pursuant to
§ 78-34-16. In response, the City argued that because the action was still pending and
had not been dismissed voluntarily, an award of fees and costs under § 78-34-16 was
inappropriate. The Cropper court rejected that argument on the basis of the City's
representations to the trial court and concluded that the statute dealt clearly with the fee
issue where "the condemnor elects not to go ahead with the acquisition." Cropper at 630
(emphasis added).
Discussing the purpose of the fee statute, the Cropper court recognized the
voluntary nature of the act required for abandonment.
It would appear that the provision of the amendment as set forth
above were intended by the legislature to deal with the practice of
condemnors initiating proceedings to acquire private property for
public use and imposing upon the owners the burdens of trial or the
preparation for a trial and then abandoning the proceedings, when it
appeared that the price was too high, or for some other reason the
condemnor elected not to proceed further.
Cropper at 630 (emphasis added). The phrase "elected not to proceed" does not
contemplate a situation where the condemnor is prohibited by a court ruling from

14

proceeding. Clearly, regardless of whether it is an issue of price or "some other reason,"
the condemnor must voluntarily decide not to go ahead with the condemnation.
None of the elements of Cropper are present here. While the value of the
properties at issue has significantly increased since the original proceeding was initiated,
the City has not determined that it is too expensive to proceed. In fact, it paid $600,000
into court to continue with condemnation of the properties so it could construct the road.
Nor has the City elected "not to go ahead with the acquisition." The City has, in fact,
acquired the properties and constructed the connecting arterial roadway. The sole issue
remaining for trial in the condemnation is value, including severance damages, scheduled
for later this month.
That Provo City is footing the bill for the acquisition of the properties and
construction of the roadway is very relevant to the Utah County condemnation. By
interlocal agreement, approved by the Utah Supreme Court, the County is using its power
of eminent domain for the benefit of Provo City as well as county residents. All of the
costs of litigation, acquisition and construction are being borne by the City. City
representatives have attended all meetings related to the condemnation and made all final
decisions about litigation-related issues.
The City clearly has not abandoned its efforts to acquire the property by
condemnation and, in fact, has done so. There simply is no abandonment to support a
statutory award of fees and costs.
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C.

THE CITY DID NOT CAUSE THE ACTION TO BE DISMISSED.

In Cropper, the City caused the matter to be dismissed by its representations to the
trial court that it had elected not to proceed with the condemnation and would "withdraw"
from the matter. In this case, the City has done nothing to cause the dismissal of the
action. It is true that the City did not immediately amend its complaint to actively pursue
its condemnation under the Transit Corridor Preservation Act as suggested in Ivie I or
pursuant to the legislative amendment to § 10-8-2(l)(b) which would have permitted its
extraterritorial condemnation. It chose instead to await the outcome of Ivies' appeal of
the Utah County condemnation before choosing the procedure for continuing with its
condemnation of the properties. It would be a waste of resources, judicial and otherwise,
to have pursued both condemnation actions concurrently. However, the property had to
be acquired through one proceeding or the other.
After the Utah County appeal had been decided, the City sought to have this action
consolidated with the Utah County action so the monies held by the trial court could be
transferred and applied to the required deposit precedent to immediate occupancy in the
Utah County case. Concurrent with the motion to consolidate, Ivies filed their motion to
dismiss.
The City admits that it need not have applied to the Court for dismissal of the
action in order to have caused the dismissal. The scenarios discussed by Ivies, however,
do not apply here. If the City had clearly abandoned its attempts to acquire the property
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and took no further action to advance the litigation, that would be sufficient cause for a
defendant to seek dismissal and a cost/fee award. Here, however, the City did not
abandon the condemnation and simply awaited the outcome of the Utah County case prior
to deciding whether to amend its complaint and proceed with this action. It is also
significant here that Ivies did nothing to obtain dismissal of the action during the same
period. Contrary to Ivies' argument, the City's alleged inactivity did not cause the
dismissal.
D.

THE CONDEMNATION ACTION WAS NOT DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Even if the City had caused the action to be dismissed, the statute expressly
requires that the dismissal be without prejudice.4 Because this was an involuntary
dismissal, however, the dismissal was with prejudice. The Rules of Civil Procedure state
that, in the case of an involuntary dismissal, "[ujnless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for
lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits." Rule 41(b),
Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). See also Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah
1997) (it is "a general rule that if a court grants an involuntary dismissal and does not
specify whether it is with or without prejudice, it is assumed that the dismissal is with

4

Ivies ignore this requirement of the statute, arguing that the action need only be
dismissed.
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prejudice.55).5 Because there was no dismissal without prejudice, there can be no fee/cost
award.
E.

BECAUSE THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN AWARD
OF COSTS AND FEES WERE NOT SATISFIED, THE TRIAL
COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THAT AWARD.

Ivies argue that the City's interpretation of § 78-34-16 is "absurd" and inconsistent
with the remedy the legislature intended to provide.6 In doing so, they would have the
Court ignore the express language used by the legislature. However, in the express
language of the statute, as construed by the Supreme Court, there are three unambiguous
requirements to be satisfied before an award of fees and costs is appropriate: (1) The
condemnation must be totally abandoned; (2) The City must cause the action to be
dismissed; and (3) The dismissal must be without prejudice. Because those requirements
were not satisfied, the trial court correctly denied the motion for fees and costs as a matter
of law.

5

Ivies could have, but did not, seek dismissal without prejudice. Moreover, they
could have included the "without prejudice" language in the order which they drafted, but
did not do so.
6

We note that the legislature, in enacting § 78-34-16, provided a remedy not
available to condemnees at common law. As a result, it had the discretion to prescribe the
boundaries and conditions for that remedy. That the remedy does not extend as far as
Ivies would like is an issue for the legislature, not the courts.
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II.

IVIES' CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT.
Ivies identify as part of their issues for review the question of whether the trial

court erred in ruling "that just compensation in Utah does not encompass reimbursement
of expenses, costs and attorneys5 fees." Their argument is based upon construction of
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. That issue and related argument, however,
are not properly before this Court.
As a threshold matter, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require a party to cite
to the record to establish that an issue was preserved for appeal, Rule 24(a)(5)(A),
Utah R. App. P., or provide "a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court." Rule 24(a)(5)(B). Ivies have done neither.
There are, however, two more fundamental problems with Ivies' constitutional
argument. First, despite Ivies' statement of the issue, the trial court's memorandum
decision did not address or rule on the issue of whether just compensation in Article I,
section 22 mandates an award of attorney fees under the facts of this case. (R. 837-842.)
In fact, Ivies never presented that issue to the trial court in a manner sufficient to preserve
it for appeal. Ivies' memoranda on the attorney fee issue contain no such argument.
(R. 771-781 and R. 816-825.)
It is well-established that a party may not raise a substantive issue for the first time
upon appeal E.g., Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987).
Despite the established policy, this Court continually has to remind appellants of the rule.
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E.g., Centennial Inv. Co.. LLC v. NuttalL 2007 UT App. 321, H 26, n. 7,171 P.3d 458,
464 (declining to address part of attorney fee question not preserved for appeal). The
only exceptions to this rule are where a trial court's ruling on the newly raised issue
constituted plain error or where there are exceptional circumstances which justify
addressing the issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, If 34, 44
P.3d 690, 698-99. Neither is present here.
This Court has explained what steps are necessary for preserving a substantive
issue for appeal.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring
the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. Issues not raised in the trial
court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding the appellate
court from considering their merits on appeal. Second, the issue
must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to
a level of consciousness before the trial court. Third, the party must
introduce to the trial court supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority to support its argument.
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125,129-30 (Utah App. 1997) (punctuation,
citations omitted). The Hart court noted that merely mentioning an issue in the pleadings
or raising an issue in post-trial motions do not preserve the issue for appeal. Id. Further,
even if a post-trial motion did raise the issue, where the court did not rule on the issue and
the party did not point out to the court its failure to rule, the issue was not preserved for
appeal. Id. The bottom line is that the party wishing to raise the issue on appeal has the
burden of preserving the issue.
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"When issues are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely manner, they
are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate] court from considering their merits on
appeal." Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT App 239,1125, 8 P.3d 281, 288
(punctuation, citation omitted).
That the issue is a constitutional one makes no difference. "Absent plain error or
exceptional circumstances . . . an appellate court will not consider an issue - even a
constitutional issue - which is raised for the first time on appeal." Hatch v. Davis, 2004
UT App 378,1156,102 P.3d 774, 787 (citations omitted).
The ruling by the trial court on Ivies' statutory claim to attorney fees did not
constitute plain error. Nor are there exceptional circumstances which would justify
considering an issue not presented to the trial court. Under Utah law, Ivies have waived
their constitutional argument and that issue is not properly before this Court.
III.

EVEN IF IVIES HAD PRESERVED THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE,
THEIR ARGUMENTS HAVE NO MERIT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.
Ivies argue that the scope of just compensation required in Article I, section 22 of

the Utah Constitution includes compensation for attorney fees and costs. Their argument
fails for two reasons. First, the first condemnation action did not result in a taking of their
properties. Because there was no taking, no compensation is due in the first action.
Secondly, the Utah Supreme Court has already determined that the costs of litigating a
condemnation action are not recoverable as just compensation.
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The language of Article I, section 22 is short and unambiguous: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." On its face, the
constitutional provision requires that property have been taken or damaged as a
prerequisite to the payment of compensation. In the first condemnation action, Ivies were
successful in preventing the taking of their properties.7 Because there was no taking of
the properties effected by the first action, the requirement for compensation never arose.
Regardless of whether fees and costs are a part of just compensation, they cannot be
awarded here because there is no requirement for compensation in this case.
The Utah appellate courts have not specifically considered whether attorney fees
are encompassed within just compensation. The Supreme Court, however, has held that
the costs of litigating a condemnation action are not an element of just compensation.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Tooele County v. Ferrebee, 844 P.2d 308, 314 (Utah 1992).
Ferrebee involved an attempt to collect expert witness fees for the defendant's appraisal
expert. The analysis there, however, also covers the issue of attorney fees.
The defendant in Ferrebee argued, as do Ivies here, that a condemnation defendant
should be permitted to recoup costs for issues on which he prevails.
He asserts that private citizens are often in disadvantageous positions
relative to condemning authority. As a result, the argument

7

The fact that the properties were acquired in the second condemnation would not
avoid this problem. The issue of just compensation for the completed taking is being
tried in that matter and presents issues entirely independent of those presented in this
appeal.
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continues, landowners often spend substantial amounts of money to
refute a government appraisal and should be compensated
accordingly should their appraisals prevail at trial.
Ferrebee at 313. The Ferrebee court reviewed case law from other jurisdictions,
including the Colorado and Florida cases cited by Ivies, Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 P.2d 283 (1940) and Dade County v. Brigham. 47 So.2d 602
(Fla. 1950). Ferrebee at 313-314. After that review, the Ferrebee court concluded that
the prevailing practice is to allow fees only where expressly provided for by statute and
adopted that rule. Id. at 313. The court then noted the two statutory provisions contained
in the Utah eminent domain statutes and concluded that "the scope of statutory
entitlement is appropriate and [we] will not award expert fees absent a statutory grant. Id.
The Ferrebee court then turned to the constitutional issue raised here by Ivies,
addressing it as a matter of first impression.
Because no statutory basis exists to support an award of appraisal
fees, we next consider whether constitutional concerns warrant
inclusion of such an award as "just compensation" within the
meaning of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution or the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Ferrebee at 313.
The Supreme Court then rejected the analysis of the Colorado and Florida courts
and concluded that there is no constitutional basis for an award of fees.
We are persuaded by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Bodcaw holding that while compensating a landowner for costs
incurred in defending a condemnation action may be fair or efficient,
such compensation is a matter of legislative grace rather than
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constitutional command. Since the Utah legislature has defined
those situations in which compensation is appropriate and has not
deemed the present one to be among them, we hold that an award of
appraisal fees is not warranted under the statutes or constitution of
the state.
Ferrebee at 314 (punctuation, citation omitted).
The same rationale applies to Ivies' claim that the Utah Constitution encompasses
attorney fees within its just compensation requirement. Whether payment of those fees is
fair is not the issue. They simply do not constitute value of the property and are not part
of compensation for that value. As a result, Ivies are entitled to an award of fees and
costs only if they establish that the requirements of § 78-34-16 have been met. Because
they were not, no award is appropriate, under either the statute or Article I, section 22.
CONCLUSION
An award of attorney fees and costs is appropriate under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-16 and governing case law only where the condemnation proceeding or effort has
been totally abandoned, the condemning authority caused dismissal of the action and the
dismissal was without prejudice. None of these three requirements has been satisfied in
this matter. The trial court therefore correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that Ivies are not
entitled to that award.
There is no alternative basis in the Utah or U.S. constitutions for an award of fees
as part of just compensation. There was no completed taking in the case at bar, so no
compensation was due. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that fees may only
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be recovered where provided by statute and that those fees are not compensation under
Article I, section 22.
Because the trial court's ruling was correct as a matter of law and Ivies have failed
to establish a basis for their claim to fees and costs, the City respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the trial court decision
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